The following is a cross-post from NFL.com, where we’ve recently launched a Football Freakonomics Project.
Icing the kicker: Even casual football fans have come to expect that when a game is on the line and the kicker is brought out to try a crucial field goal, the opposing coach might call a timeout just as the kicker approaches the ball.
Makes sense, doesn’t it? The coach can “ice” the kicker — mess with his mind, throw off his routine, make him stand around like an awkward guy at a cocktail party for all the world to see.
But does it work?
The short answer: No. In their book Scorecasting, Tobias J. Moskowitz and L. Jon Wertheim marshal the most compelling evidence to date on the subject, analyzing “pressure” kicks from 2001 through 2009 while controlling for distance of the field-goal attempt. They found that icing the kicker certainly doesn’t produce the desired effect, and in some cases might even backfire. The one situation in which icing might confer a slim advantage: When there are fewer than 15 seconds left in the game. Here’s their data:
|
Field goal success whether opponent calls a timeout or not
(Percentage of kicks made) |
|||
|
Situation
|
All kicks
|
Iced
|
Not iced
|
|---|---|---|---|
| Less than two minuntes left in fourth quarter or OT | 76.2% | 74.2% | 77.6% |
| Less than one minunte left in fourth quarter or OT | 75.5% | 74.3% | 76.4% |
| Less than 30 seconds left in fourth quarter or OT | 76.5% | 76.0% | 76.9% |
| Less than 15 seconds left in fourth quarter or OT | 76.4% | 77.5% | 75.4% |
Moskowitz and Wertheim also looked for the icing effect in “pressure” free throws in NBA games, and similarly found that icing made no difference. Interestingly, NBA players make about 76 percent of their “pressure” foul shots — the same percentage as pressure field goals in the NFL.
So if icing doesn’t really work, why do we still see so much of it?
Here are a few theories. Feel free to add your own in the comments.
» It has become tradition — and, as Tevye taught us, tradition doesn’t get broken easily.
» Coaches are a generally risk-averse group, and find it’s easier to parrot an accepted strategy — even if it’s worthless — than explain why they deviated from accepted tradition.
» Even in the NFL, where coaches arguably have more influence on their teams than other sports, they don’t really get to do all that much during a game. Running up to the sideline official at the crucial point in a game and frantically making a T with your hands is an acceptable and laudable form of intervention. Good TV, too.
» Since it’s been around for a while now, the novelty effect of icing has worn off; while it may have messed with the minds of the first few kickers it was tried on, once the surprise element has worn off, it no longer harms the kicker and perhaps even helps by giving him more time to set up, assess the wind, etc.
» Icing confirms how the football universe views the kicker — as a lesser being, not a real athlete, a man (barely!) whose fragile psyche is susceptible to bruising. Think about it: When’s the last time you saw a coach try to ice an opposing quarterback?
and 
. You can also watch it on 
1. “Football Freakonomics”: Icing the Kicker
2. “Football Freakonomics”: Why Even Ice the Kicker?
… really ?
For me, as an non-American , it’s like trying to demonstrate cheating among sumo wrestler and findout out they don’t cheat… TWICE !
For me as an American, too.
I like the idea of pretending to like you are going to ice the kicker, but then not actually doing it. The kicker says, “eh, they’re just going to ice me, so no need to get ready right now.” then when you don’t, the kicker is surprised and misses.
That’s a factor too — before you call timeout, there’s uncertainty. Once you call timeout, the kicker knows when he will kick.
Does it work better in low temperatures when you make the kicker stand there and get cold. You know, when you actually ice them.
Couple of comments:
1. Ben’s post having a 43 to 1 thumbs up ratio revives my faith in that feature.
2. The other comment about studying each kicker’s icing history also makes sense.
3. It has to be considered that in some situations, the other team having 1:59 seconds left will not be a place to “blow” a time-out if they can still attempt a rally, even if the field goal puts them two scores down. I am sure hundreds of NFL games have seen two-score rallies with less than two minutes to go. So, some of those decisions to “not ice” made not have really been decisions.
4. The other scenario that has to be considered is that sometimes the play clock, or even the game clock, is running as the team is setting up to kick. It may be that the stress of that would also make it a bad decision to “ice”.
In other words, I think to really get the data, the kick has to be an end of the quarter or end of the game (or literal end of the game, like putting the team up two scores with less than 10 seconds or so.)
Well, I think it maybe a psychological thing. People enjoy watching the last few seconds of any sport where the score is close. I, myself, can only watch basketball after the clock goes 1:59 in the 4th, that is when I become a huge fan. We enjoy the feeling we get, the suspense to find out what is going to happen. Unlike daunting tasks where we can’t wait for them to be over, in sporting events and events that bring us entertainment, we don’t want them to end: We like to delay the inevitable. That is why the practice of “icing” has stayed in effect despite it not actually working. The practice hasn’t met any objection from fans and has simply become a mindless tradition.
As for the coaches, that’s easy… Why not call the TO? You have nothing to lose, and may even think of some brilliant scheme in the extra 45 seconds you bought your team. Your players might be able to “pysch” out the kicker or offensive line. Who knows? You still have everything to gain and nothing to lose.
Another point to remember. . . Particularly in recent years, the kicking team will snap the ball after the timeout has been called to give the kicker a practice kick identical to the real thing. You need to find the statistics for these situations. You’d have to think conversion would be higher.
I can’t believe no one has mentioned this yet, but the threat of being iced should be the real factor. As Caleb suggested, often the kicker will expect to be iced but is forced to kick when no timeout is called, and perhaps this affects his nerves.
Since icing is now a ubiquitous tactic, the real comparison should be made between kickers whose opponents have timeouts remaining versus those who do not, in those situations where the kicker would normally be iced (ie game-ending kicks). No timeouts remaining, no threat of icing, no problem.
If you don’t control for this, you might as well go ahead and argue that pitchers should throw nothing but curveballs, since curveballs are generally more effective than fastballs. The curveball is successful because the batter doesn’t know whether it’s coming or not.
Reading this on a Friday, and going to a hockey game on Sunday, made me think of another late-game sports activity: Removing the hockey goalie to get the extra attacker in the last two minutes.
What’s the relative rate of pay-off (points gained/lost, games that go from losses to ties, etc) and does it actually make sense to do?
I can’t remember where, but I have read the study on this (maybe even in Freakonomics?). Essentially, the result of pulling the goalie in hockey is an increase in the likelihood of a goal, by either team. The team that pulls their goalie gets scored on fairly often, but they also increase their own likelihood of scoring by some smaller amount. In other words, you are increasing the volatility of goal-scoring in a way that is negative in relation to your expected goal differential, but positive once you make the risk-adjustment for the fact that losing by 2 is the same as losing by 1, but tying the game is a vast improvement over losing by any amount.
So the decision becomes: when do I pull the goalie? The longer you play without a goalie, the more likely you are to be scored on, cementing your loss. However, if you never pull your goalie, you decrease your own likelihood of scoring the goal that could swing the decision, which isn’t good.
This is all based on hazy memory, but I believe they found that the optimal time to pull the goalie is with ~100 seconds remaining in the game, once you have clear possession of the puck. Your goal is to maximize your own time of possession with an extra attacker without guaranteeing the other team possession(s) without a goalie to face. You want enough time to get the job done while preserving the chance that the other team will never get a chance to shoot.
Interesting stuff, and I don’t even watch much hockey.